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ABSTRACT

In an era of scarce public resources, many jurisdictions are
being forced to take drasticmeasures to address severe budgetary
constraintson the administrationof criminal justice. As prosecutors' budgets around the nation are being scaled back and enforcement capacitiesare being narrowed,one conceivable response
is the outsourcingof the criminal prosecution function to private
lawyers. Indeed, prosecution outsourcing currently is utilized in
surprising measure by jurisdictions in the United States. This
Article, prepared for the University of Chicago Legal Forum
Symposium on Crime, Criminal Law, and the Recession, argues
that the outsourcing trend in criminal justice-seen most prominently in the area of private prisons and policing-should not
extend to criminalprosecution because such outsourcing is in tension with the constitutionaland positive law norms regulatingthe
public-private distinction. Furthermore, concerns about ethics,
fairness, transparency, accountability, performance, and the important values advanced by the public prosecution norm all militate against the outsourcing of the criminal prosecution function
to private lawyers.
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INTRODUCTION

The private role in criminal justice has grown considerably
over the past three decades, particularly in corrections and policing. The most common form of privatization in this arena has
been outsourcing, an arrangement in which the government contracts with a private entity to render goods or services previously
provided by the government. Advocates of outsourcing cite efficiency, enhanced service, and cost savings as rationales for the
private performance of these criminal justice functions.
Many of these same perceived benefits presumably could be
derived from the outsourcing of the prosecutorial function to private lawyers-a particularly tempting solution in an era of diminished public resources prompted by the current economic crisis. In fact, the prosecutorial function already is being outsourced
to private lawyers in smaller jurisdictions across the United
States. This phenomenon is poised to expand as larger jurisdictions are forced to slash already tight law enforcement budgets.
This Article argues that such prosecution outsourcing is in tension with the constitutional and positive law norms governing
outsourcing and privatization.
Part I of the Article examines the growing trend of privatization and outsourcing in the criminal justice system through the
prism of private prisons and private policing. Part II provides the
contours of what is the central focus of the Article's critique and
analysis-the outsourcing of the criminal prosecution function.
Part II sets out two thought experiments to serve as a point of
departure for the subsequent discussion of the nature, extent,
and future prospects of government delegation of criminal prosecution to private actors.
Part III then argues that prosecution outsourcing is in tension with norms regulating the public-private distinction, including those gleaned both from constitutional constraints on the
delegation of governmental functions to private actors, and from
the positive law of government outsourcing. Part III also raises a
number of ethical, performance, and accountability concerns with
the government practice of contracting with private attorneys to
prosecute criminal cases.
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I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRIVATIZATION

Government engages in a substantial amount of privatiza2
tion.' "Privatization is a word with many different meanings,"
but it typically is used to characterize the phenomenon in which
government delegates to the private sector functions formerly
performed by the state and deemed to be public. 3 The state privatizes functions for a variety of reasons, ranging from entity
diversity and interest representation to expertise, cost savings,
and efficiency. 4 Of the various species of privatization engaged in
by American governmental entities, 5 the most common type of
See Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 Fla St U L Rev 155, 155 (2000) ("In
the United States, federal, state, and local governments now routinely employ contracts
with private providers to furnish services, deliver benefits, and perform significant (and
sometimes traditionally 'public') functions."); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 Colum L Rev 1367, 1369 (2003) ("Recent privatization efforts, particularly
in health care and welfare programs, public education, and prisons, reveal a trend of
greater discretion and broader responsibilities being delegated to private hands."); Scott
Shane and Ron Nixon, In Washington, ContractorsTake On Biggest Role Ever, NY Times
All (Feb 4, 2007); Jeff McDonald, City Looks at County's Outsourcing as Blueprint, SD
Union-Trib Al (July 23, 2006).
This privatization trend, which, as Professor Freeman notes, has been developing
over the past half-century, is unlikely to cease in the near future. See Freeman, 28 Fla St
U L Rev at 161-62 (cited in note 1). See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Book Review,
OutsourcingIs Not Our Only Problem, 76 Geo Wash L Rev 1216, 1227 (2008). However,
recent political changes may lead to the eventual scaling back of federal reliance on contractors. See The White House, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies Re Government Contracting, 74 Fed Reg 9755 (Mar 4, 2009); Daniel
Zwerdling, Obama to Tackle Explosion in FederalContracts, National Public Radio Morning Edition (Dec 1, 2008). See also Daniel Zwerdling, New President Faces Powerful
Federal Contractors,National Public Radio Morning Edition (Dec 2, 2008).
2 Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1377 (cited in note 1). See also Allison Stanger, One
Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign
Policy (Yale 2009).
3 See Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1377 (cited in note 1) (observing that the term
"privatization" "is conventionally understood to signify a transfer of public responsibilities
to private hands"); Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market: Legislating on Privatizationand
Subcontracting,60 Md L Rev 249, 258 (2001) (describing privatization as "a blanket term
that includes different forms of shifting from publicly to privately produced goods and
services"); David M. Lawrence, PrivateExercise of Governmental Power, 61 Ind L J 647,
647 (1985) (defining privatization as "turning formerly governmental responsibilities over
to the private sector"); Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., The Privatizationof Criminal Justice, in
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Southern Conference on Corrections 111 (Florida State
1984) (defining privatization as the "non-governmental performance of a function").
4 See Pierce, 76 Geo Wash L Rev at 1227 (cited in note 1) ("The number of government functions that can only be performed effectively by highly skilled people is steadily
increasing. The market for such highly skilled people has changed to the point at which
the salaries they can command in the private market vastly exceed the maximum salary
the government can pay."); Lawrence, 61 Ind L J at 651-57 (cited in note 3) (suggesting
that pluralism, interest representation, flexibility of private entities, expertise, and cost
are all justifications).
5 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms through Privatization,116 Harv
L Rev 1285, 1287 (2003).
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privatization is outsourcing-the "contracting out with a private
firm for the production of some good or service that was
previously exclusively produced by a public-sector agency or
6
bureaucracy."
Importantly, under the "outsourcing" or "contracting-out"
model of privatization, the government does not cede the fundamental duty or responsibility for the performance of the function.
The government maintains the duty to ensure the function is
performed, but simply contracts with a private actor to perform
it. 7 As criminal justice privatization proponent Bruce Benson
notes, under a "contracting-out" regime "[tihe determination of
what is going to be demanded from and produced by the firm
under contract remains in the political arena, under the influence of interest groups and public officials rather than under the
6 Bruce L. Benson, To Serve and Protect:Privatizationand Community in Criminal
Justice 15 (NYU 1998); see also Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1378, 1378 n 17 (cited in
note 1); Freeman, 116 Harv L Rev at 1287 (cited in note 5).
A significant amount of recent scholarly commentary has focused on contemporary
and historical American privatization in the military and foreign policy arena. See generally Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the
Future of Foreign Policy (cited in note 2); Benedict Sheehy, Jackson Maogoto, and
Virginia Newell, Legal Control of the Private Military Corporation (Palgrave Macmillan
2009); Simon Chesterman, From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of
Private Military Companies (Oxford 2007); Steven L. Schooner and Daniel S.
Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance, J Cont Mgmt 209 (Summer 2008). See also Theodore M. Cooperstein, Letters of
Marque and Reprisal: The ConstitutionalLaw and Practice of Privateering,40 J Marit L
& Comm 221 (2009); William Young, A Check on Faint-HeartedPresidents: Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev 895 (2009).
For a broad introduction to the topic of privatization from various perspectives, see
generally Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher, eds, Private Security, Public Order:
The Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits (Oxford 2009); Jody Freeman and
Martha Minow, eds, Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy
(Harvard 2009); Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of
Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about It (Cambridge
2007); Martha Minow, Partners,Not Rivals: Privatizationand the Public Good (Beacon
2002); Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1371 (cited in note 1); Jody Freeman, The Private
Role in Public Governance,75 NYU L Rev 543, 595 (2000).
7 This can be contrasted with the other major model of privatization, in which the
government "remov[es] certain responsibilities, activities, or assets from the collective
realm." Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1378 (cited in note 1), quoting John D. Donahue,
The PrivatizationDecision: Public Ends, Private Means 215 (Basic 1989) ([Mwo concepts
share the same word-privatization.The first concept ... involves removing certain responsibilities, activities or assets from the collective realm.... [T]he second... [involves]
retaining collective financing but delegating delivery to the private sector."). See also
Stan Soloway and Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in Context, in Freeman and
Minow, eds, Government by Contract195-97 (cited in note 6).
A common example of this type of public-private partnership can be found in the
many road, bridge, or tunnel construction public works projects that are privately financed in exchange for the private entity's right to extract tolls to recoup costs and turn a
profit.
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direct control of private citizens acting as individual buyers."8
Benson terms this approach "partial privatization." 9 In contrast,
.complete privatization" entails "private-sector control over all of
the decisions regarding the use of resources devoted to the protection of persons and property." 10
Although some have theorized that government could engage in complete privatization in the criminal justice arena,1 1
most criminal justice outsourcing can be characterized as "partial" privatization. For example, government might privatize certain aspects of the provision of a service (for example, a prison
contracting out the preparation of meals for inmates) or even the
entire provision of a service (for example, contracting with a private corporation to operate a prison), 12 but would not simply
withdraw from the duty of providing corrections and leave it to
the private market to determine whether and how individuals
will be incarcerated. As Professor Metzger explains:
[P]rivatization is poorly characterized as government
withdrawal or disinvolvement from an area of activity ....
In many instances of privatization, the overall context
remains one of significant government endeavor; ... the
government provides the funds, sets programmatic goals
and requirements, or enacts the regulatory scheme into
which private decisionmaking is incorporated. But the
government relies on private actors for actual implementation. Rather than government withdrawal, the result is
a system of public-private collaboration, a "regime of
'mixed administration'" in which both public and private
1 3
actors share responsibilities.
While acknowledging the rich complexity attending the concept
of government outsourcing, this Article uses the terms "outsourcing," "contracting out," and "privatization" in the spirit of
8 Benson, To Serve and Protect at 15 (cited in note 6).
9 Id.
10 Id. See also Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1370 (cited in note 1).
11 Criminal justice scholar Laurin Wollan describes this as the "'step back and let it
go' strategy," which entails "going beyond mere substitution of private for public performance under contractual or other constraints." Wollan, The Privatization of Criminal
Justice at 124 (cited in note 3). Wollan ponders whether criminal justice privatization can
expand to full and complete privatization by "boldly going to the point-and without
provision for such controlled substitutions-of simply letting the function be, to see if it
gets performed at all." Id.
12 See Part I.A.1.
13 Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1394-95 (cited in note 1) (internal citations omitted).
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Benson's "partial" privatization definition. Under this conception, the government entity never cedes the prerogative of directing the efforts of the private actor and never disowns the fundamental duty to ensure the function is performed (by whoever is
14
tasked with performing it) in the first place.
The private role in criminal justice administration has become more pronounced in recent years. 15 From crime prevention
and detection to adjudication and corrections, private actors per16
form functions many would assume were exclusively public.
14 The use of the word "function" here carries significance. Another important dichotomy in the outsourcing literature is the privatization of governmental powers versus the
privatization of governmental functions. See generally Lawrence, 61 Ind L J 647 (cited in
note 3) (distinguishing between privatization of government functions and privatization
of governmental powers, and concluding that the latter is more problematic). The contracting out of tax collection to a private collection agency would be an example of privatization of a governmental function. Granting a private entity the ability to freeze a taxpayer's assets for nonpayment of taxes might be considered an example of the privatization of a governmental power. Also, it is important to note that when outsourcing governmental functions to private actors, governments can retain control while outsourcing
the execution. See, for example, Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police,
2005 Utah L Rev 573, 586 ("[A] public agency retains oversight over the prison, even
though day-to-day management may be left to the privately contracted company."). Alternatively, a government could cede to a private entity all control and authority over the
provision of a function. Related to this concept is the division between those functions
which are ministerial in nature and those which require the exercise of discretion by
those performing the function. See Part III.B.
15 See generally Ric Simmons, Private CriminalJustice, 42 Wake Forest L Rev 911
(2007).
16 See Stanger, One Nation under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and
the Future of Foreign Policy 26 (cited in note 2) ("Running a prison or policing the streets
seems like an inherently governmental function-an essential part of 'preventing coercion' or 'protecting citizens'-yet both prisons and policing have been privatized."); Benson, To Serve and Protect 17 (cited in note 6) ("[M]any components of the public sector's
criminal justice system are actually being produced by employees of private firms."). See
also Charles H. Logan, Private Prisons:Cons and Pros 58-59 (Oxford 1990); Wollan, The
Privatizationof Criminal Justice at 113-23 (cited in note 3). Professor Wollan makes the
point that although most would reflexively resist the notion that criminal justice might be
conducted by private actors, once the various criminal justice functions are dissected, the
private role is more easily acknowledged (or imagined). See id at 113-14. For instance,
although pre-trial supervision and detention would appear to be an exclusively public
function, the bail bondsman is a stark example of the state ceding to private actors a
public criminal justice function. A private bail bondsman provides to the court the total
amount of a defendant's bail in exchange for a nonrefundable fee (typically 10 percent of
the bail amount) from the defendant and perhaps some form of collateral to ensure the
defendant's appearance and the bondsman's recovery of the bail money. The risk of financial loss gives the bondsman an incentive to track down and bring to court bailed defendants who have absconded. For a description of the private bail bondsman's role, see, for
example, Stephen A. Saltzburg and Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure93640 (Thomson 8th ed 2007). Without this private role, the alternative might be widespread
incidence of defendants without financial resources having to remain in jail prior to trial,
see id at 937, or even a move to universal pre-trial detention, an option that would be
both cost-prohibitive and unwise from a public policy and penological standpoint.
Also, part-time judges-private lawyers hired to hear cases in public courts on a
part-time or fee basis-are utilized in many jurisdictions. See, for example, Tenn Code
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The expanding private role in criminal justice is most notable
and visible in the areas of private prisons and private policing.
A.

Outsourcing Corrections-Private Prisons

Private prisons are a prominent example of outsourcing in
criminal justice at both the federal and state levels. 17 Despite the
decidedly public nature of modern corrections,1 8 governments
have engaged in the contracting of prison administration services
for juvenile offenders since the 1800s. 19 In response to the explosion in prison population prompted by the drug enforcement policies of the 1980s and 1990s, governments began to rely more
heavily upon the private sector for the provision of corrections
services for adults. 20 As a result, a significant number of state
21
and federal prisoners are now in the custody of private entities.
Prison outsourcing can range from the private provision of
certain services, such as inmate medical care and feeding, to the
full private operation of a correctional facility. 22 In all of these
roles, private prison contractors might exercise tremendous dis§ 7-3-311(g)(2003); State of Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline, Opinion JE04-03
(Mar 17, 2004), online at http/judicial.state.nv.us/je040033new.htm (visited Sept 7,
2010); J. Anthony McLain, Part-TimeJudges, Part-TimeAssistant DistrictAttorneys and
Imputed Disqualification,70 Ala Law 217 (2009). However, the practice has come under
fire on the grounds that it presents the perception-if not the reality-of conflict of interest, and undermines the rule of law. See, for example, Sarah Foster, Ohio Considers
Eliminating Part-Time Judges, Miami Student (Sept 26, 2006), online at http/www.
miamistudent.net/2.8197/ohio-considers-eliminating-part-time-judges-1.1153773
(visited
Sept 7, 2010); James L. Cotton, Jr., The Impossible Balance:A Tennessee Judge Makes the
Case for Abolishing State's Part-TimeJudgeships, 37 Term Bar J 12, 15 (May 2001).
17 As Professor Jody Freeman observes, the history of public corrections and its provision of prison labor to the private sector "complicates the common view of incarceration
as a traditionally public enterprise." Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 626 (cited in note 6). See
also Metzger, 103 Colurn L Rev at 1392 (cited in note 1); Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at
162, 185-86 (cited in note 1).
18 See, for example, Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1499 (cited in note 1) ("Notwithstanding the lengthy historical pedigree of private involvement in incarceration, today
punishment and the legitimate use of physical coercion are seen as exclusive state prerogatives.").
19 See Logan, Private Prisons9, 15 (cited in note 16). Although the operation of secure correctional facilities has not been privatized widely on the federal level, the federal
Bureau of Prisons has outsourced its community-based halfway house operations for the
past thirty years. See Benson, To Serve and Protect at 21 (cited in note 6); Logan, Private
Prisonsat 16 (cited in note 16).
20 See Logan, Private Prisons at 9-10, 20 (cited in note 16). Sharon Dolovich, State
Punishment and PrivatePrisons,55 Duke L J 437, 439-40 (2005).
21 Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1393 (cited in note 1) ("In 2001, 12.3% of all federal
prisoners and 5.8% of all state prisoners, approximately 92,000 inmates, were housed in
private prison facilities.").
22 See Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 185-87 (cited in note 1); see also Minow,
Partners,Not Rivals at 20 (cited in note 6).
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cretion. 23 Also, because private prison contractors act as agents
of the state, misconduct by private prison officials may be actionable, in certain circumstances, against the outsourcing govern24
ment entity under constitutional tort principles.
25
The literature on private prisons is rich and wide-ranging.
Some commentators reject the premise that private prisons are
practically viable or bristle at the notion that private actors are
entrusted with the sovereign duty to punish. 26 Others perceive
the heightened potential for corruption and human rights abuses
in private prisons. 27 However, many trumpet private prisons as a
way to deliver higher-quality, safer corrections at a fraction of
the cost of public corrections. 28 Although there are many issues
generated by the debate over whether a private firm should provide public correctional services, 29 "[flew deny that private pris23 See Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 188 (cited in note 1).
24 See Verkuil, OutsourcingSovereignty at 38 (cited in note 6).
25 For insightful commentary on the myriad considerations highlighted in the debate
surrounding the private provision of corrections services, see Logan, Private Prisons at
38-48 (cited in note 16). See also generally Gary W. Bowman et al, eds, PrivatizingCorrectional Institutions (Transaction 1993); Douglas C. McDonald, ed, Private Prisons and
the Public Interest (Rutgers 1990); Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and
Economics of Political Advocacy, 60 Stan L Rev 1197 (2008); Dolovich, 55 Duke L J 437
(cited in note 20); Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40
Vand L Rev 813 (1987); Richard Culp, Prison Privatization Turns Twenty-Five: The
Evolution of a Mature Private Prison Industry in the United States, July 2009, online at
http/ssrn.con/abstract=1462792 (visited July 4, 2010).
26 See, for example, John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A CriticalPerspective on
the Private Management of Prisons and Jails, in McDonald, ed, Private Prisons and the
Public Interest 155-78 (cited in note 25); Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 631 (cited in note 6).
See also Freeman, 28 Fla St U L Rev at 187 (cited in note 1) ("Those who object to prison
privatization reject it on moral as well as pragmatic grounds.").
27 See, for example, Elaine R. Jones, Private Prisons Profiting at the Expense of
Women of Color, The New Crisis, Mar/Apr 2001, online at http;//findarticles.com/
p/articles/miqa3812/is_200103/ai n8932486?tag=content;coll (visited July 4, 2010); Lisa
Belkin, Rise of Private Prisons: How Much of a Bargain?,NY Times A14 (Mar 27, 1989).
A recent high-profile example of corruption related to the private prison industry can be
found in the case of Pennsylvania judges sentencing juveniles to private prisons in exchange for kickbacks. See Stephanie Chen, Pennsylvania Rocked by 'JailingKids for
Cash' Scandal, Cable News Network (Feb 24, 2009), online at http/www.cnn.conV
2009/CRIMF02/23/pennsylvania.corrupt.judges/ (visited Mar 17, 2010); Ian Urbina and
Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, NY Times A22
(Feb 13, 2009).
28 See, for example, Logan, PrivatePrisons at 76-118 (cited in note 16).
29 Professor Charles Logan provides a useful typology of the central concerns: (1)
propriety of having correctional services delivered by private actors; (2) whether privatization of corrections results in lower costs; (3) the impact correctional privatization will
have on the quality of imprisonment; (4) the impact correctional privatization will have
on quantity of imprisonment; (5) whether private jailers are more flexible and adaptable
to change than their bureaucratic counterparts; (6) whether private corrections providers
can ensure security of their facilities; (7) whether private corrections providers will expose government to greater or lesser tort liability; (8) whether private corrections provid-
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ons are wielding government power, given that the right to
physically constrain and coerce others is ordinarily reserved for
30
the state."
B.

Outsourcing Law Enforcement-Private Policing

Private policing is another prominent example of the private
exercise of criminal justice functions. 31 Public policing took hold
in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century.3 2 However,
over the past several decades, the private presence in policing
has increased dramatically. As Professor Ric Simmons noted in
his recent study of increasing privatization in the criminal justice system, "[t]he degree to which private entities have taken
over law enforcement functions in this country is extraordinary."33 Paul Verkuil notes that "the number of private police
exceeds the number of federal, state, and local 'public' police
34
combined."
Many private police are retained by private communities
and business groups to serve as an adjunct to the publicly paid
and maintained police force. The ubiquity of privatized police in
American society-in such familiar contexts as stadium security,
school and university police, and the ever-popular "mall cops"ers are less accountable to the public; (9) the greater or lesser susceptibility of private
corrections providers to corruption; and (1.0) whether privatization of corrections would
give rise to a dangerous governmental dependence upon the private sector for a crucial
function. See Logan, Private Prisons at 38-40 (cited in note 16). The various concerns
cited, as Logan points out, offer insight into the breadth of the "many philosophical, empirical, and policy questions" raised by private prisons. Id at 38. See also Metzger, 103
Colum L Rev at 1393-94 (cited in note 1).
30 Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1397 (cited in note 1).
31 For an introduction to the private policing regime, see generally Simmons, 42
Wake Forest L Rev 911 (cited in note 15); Joh, 2005 Utah L Rev 573 (cited in note 14);
Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradoxof Private Policing 95 J Crim L & Criminol 49 (2004);
David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L Rev 1165 (1999).
32 See Robert D. McCrie, Three Centuries of Criminal Justice Privatization in the
United States, in Gary W. Bowman et al, eds, Privatizingthe United States Justice System: Police, Adjudication, and CorrectionsServices from the Private Sector 16-17 (McFarland 1992). See also Sklansky, 46 UCLA L Rev at 1205-11 (cited in note 31).
33 Simmons, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 919 (cited in note 15)
34 Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty at 38 (cited in note 6). Private police outnumber
"public" police officers and expenditures on private police service are at least double that
for public policing. See Simmons, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 920-22 & nn 34-35 (cited in
note 15); Job, 95 J Crim & Criminol at 50 ("Private police long ago outpaced the public
police in terms of persons employed and dollars spent.") (cited in note 31); Sklansky, 46
UCLA L Rev at 1165 (cited in note 31) ("The private security industry already employs
more guards, patrol personnel, and detectives than the federal, state, and local governments combined, and the disparity is growing ...

."); Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons

Private: An Improper Delegationof a Governmental Power, 15 Hofstra L Rev 649, 663-64
(1987).
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has rendered their existence unremarkable to the average
American. 35 The rationale underlying the explosion in the private
police presence is that public police resources are not sufficient to
protect the property and personal interests of those segments of
society able to afford additional security. 36 As Professor Elizabeth
Joh notes, "[m]any of these privately paid police behave like public law enforcement officers: detaining individuals, conducting
37
searches, investigating crimes, and maintaining order."
Although those apprehended by private police officers may be
turned over to the public authorities for prosecution, 38 most private police are not in privity with the state and are not state actors for purposes of constitutional remedies. 39 Therefore, conduct
that otherwise would give rise to either constitutional remedies-civil or exclusionary-against the government or its actors
is actionable only against the private police agency or the private
entity or individual employing such agency. What this means in
addition to more narrow civil remedies is the possibility that evidence will be collected in a way that offends constitutional
norms, but that still can be shared with government prosecutors
for use in establishing criminal liability.
In addition, there are instances in which the governmentrather than private entities-contracts with private firms to provide services traditionally performed by the public police. 40 As
Professor Joh notes, "[i]n publicly contracted policing, a private
police agency replaces a specific service formerly performed by
the government, rather than simply offering in the private mar-

35 Two recent studio films present a humorous, if irreverent, picture of the work done
by mall "police" officers. See Manohla Dargis, Mall Crisis? Call Security. Then Again,
Maybe Not, NY Times C1 (Apr 10, 2009) (review of Warner Brothers film Observe and
Report); Nathan Lee, A Hapless Security Guard Runs Amok, NY Times C1 (Jan 16, 2009)
(review of Sony Pictures film PaulBlart: Mall Cop).
36 See Wollan, The Privatizationof CriminalJustice (cited in note 3).
37 Joh, 95 J Crim & Criminol at 50 (cited in 31).
38 However, private entities theoretically may sponsor and conduct their own proceedings against the wrongdoer. See Simmons, 42 Wake Forest L Rev at 962 (cited in
note 15); see also Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains,89 NC L Rev (forthcoming 2011),
online at http//ssrn.com/abstract=1622846 (visited Sept 7, 2010).
39 Id at 979-81.
40 The evidence shows that the incidence of government outsourcing of police functions is considerable, though not as pervasive as government outsourcing of prison management. See Joh, 2005 Utah L Rev at 586 ("[O]nly some private policing is contracted
out by cost-conscious public agencies. Much private policing arises from the private sector
to meet private demands.") (internal citations omitted) (cited in note 14). Government
entities rank just behind manufacturing and retail firms in terms of the extent of their
outsourcing functions to private security firms. See Benson, To Serve and Protect at 18
(cited in note 6).
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ket services that also happen to be offered by government."4 ' In
this context, private policing actors are in privity with the state.
Over the past 35 years, government entities have outsourced
various "subservice" police functions, such as crime laboratory
analysis, data entry, dispatch, guarding detainees, and transporting prisoners, with increasing frequency. 42 Additionally,
what might be considered "core" police activities also have been
outsourced. 43 For instance, a number of jurisdictions have contracted with private security firms to patrol certain geographic
areas. 44 Other jurisdictions have engaged private firms to con45
duct investigations on behalf of the governmental entity.
Furthermore, although the evidence does not show the practice
to be widespread, there are instances of governments outsourcing
the entire policing function to private firms, 46 a practice that entails the robust delegation of public police authority to private
47
actors.
II. OUTSOURCING THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION
Tough economic times are forcing governments to make
difficult choices about resource allocation in the criminal justice
41 Joh, 2005 Utah L Rev at 613 (cited in note 14) (emphasis omitted).
42 See id; Philip E. Fixler, Jr., and Robert W. Poole, Jr., Can Police Services Be
Privatized?, in Bowman et al, eds, Privatizingthe United States Justice System at 31-32
(cited in note 32).
43 Id at 32.

44 See Verkuil, OutsourcingSovereignty at 38 & n 112 (cited in note 6) (noting that
"the Defense Department and GSA employ private guards [at] military and other government properties"); Benson, To Serve and Protect at 18 (cited in note 6); Fixler and
Poole, Can Police Services Be Privatized?at 32-33 (cited in note 42).
45 Benson To Serve and Protect at 18 (cited in note 6); Fixler and Poole, Can Police
Services Be Privatized?at 33 (cited in note 42).
46 See Benson, To Serve and Protect at 18, 20-21 (cited in note 6); Fixler and Poole,
Can Police Services Be Privatized? at 33-35 (cited in note 42).
47 See Joh, 2005 Utah L Rev at 614 (cited in note 14) ("The more a publicly contracted
police force is organized to replace a public force entirely, the more likely it is that full
public legal powers and complementary material resources will be made available to it.").
However, jurisdictions have tended to shy away from the complete privatization of
the police function. In one Michigan example, a jurisdiction contracted with a private firm
but deputized the individual private personnel to avoid legal issues. See Fixler and Poole,
Can Police Services Be Privatized? at 33 (cited in note 42). A jurisdiction in Ohio contracted with a private firm for police services, but retained "full autonomy in hiring, firing,
disciplining, and organizing the police force." Id at 33-34, quoting T. Gage, Cops, Inc.,
Reason 23-28 (Nov 1982). One jurisdiction in Arizona signed a contract in which it ceded
all operational decision making to the private contractor, but retained the ability to overrule the decisions made. See id at 34. In all of these examples, external pressures eventually caused the jurisdictions to abort the contractual agreement, rendering the outsourcing arrangements short-lived. See id at 33-34; Benson, To Serve and Protect at 20-21
(cited in note 6).
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arena. Many of the resulting budget cuts have been directed toward prosecutors' offices. 48 Consequently, in many jurisdictions,
reductions in personnel have led to diminished criminal enforcement capacity. 49 In the face of budgetary challenges, it is
conceivable that more jurisdictions will consider the sort of
privatization and outsourcing solutions some have relied upon in
the prison and policing contexts.
What might such prosecution outsourcing look like? Should
we outsource prosecutorial authority-and, more specifically,
prosecutorial discretion-to private actors? If not, why not? The
following two thought experiments, in which state and federal
governments outsource the criminal prosecution function to private actors, will serve as a point of departure for the discussion.
A.

North Publica, USA-State Outsourcing of Criminal
Prosecution

As part of an attempt to reduce budget costs in the wake of
declining tax revenues, the legislature of the fictional state of
North Publica passes a measure authorizing the outsourcing of a
number of government functions. One of these functions is criminal prosecution. The state legislative research service determined that, on average, a state criminal prosecutor draws a
salary of $50,000, and receives health insurance and other employment benefits worth approximately $25,000. In addition, initial training and continuing education costs, and the incremental
costs of office accommodations, secretarial support, and other
48 See, for example, Kenneth Hart, Prosecutor Offices Feel Pain from Budget Cut,
Daily Independent (Dec 27, 2008); Donna Leinwand, Cuts Have Prosecutorsat "Breaking
Point," Some Face Unpaid Leave, Less Support, USA Today 3A (Nov 21, 2008). See also
Letter from Hon. John Conyers, Jr.and Hon. Henry A. Waxman to Hon. Alberto Gonzales
(July 24,
2006),
online at httpV/oversight.house.govfrmages/stories/documents/
20060724095809-74936.pdf (visited Mar 21, 2010) (noting budget and staffing challenges
in federal prosecutors' offices).
It should be noted that public defenders' offices have fallen victim to budget cuts as
well. See, for example, Adam Liptak, PoorDefendants and a DrainedState Budget Cross
Paths in Georgia, NY Times A13 (July 6, 2010); Josh Richman, Cash-StrappedAlameda
County PublicDefender's Office Starts TurningAway Cases, San Jose Mercury News (Aug
3, 2009). Interestingly, this has caused one state public defender's office to cease reliance
upon contracting with private attorneys to handle cases presenting a conflict of interest
for the office. See Marcia Coyle, Cash-StrappedMaryland Public Defender Office Ends
Contracts With PrivateAttorneys, Natl L J (Sept 30, 2008).
49 See Henry K. Lee, D.A. Cuts Efforts on Lesser Crime, SF Chron B1 (Apr 22, 2009);
Conor Berry, Budget Questions Loom over DA's Office, Berkshire Eagle (Feb 4, 2009);
Jacinda Howard, Public Safety Takes a Big Hit in King County, Federal Way Mirror
(June 7, 2008), online at http;//www.pnwlocalnews.com/southking/fwm/news19608489.
html (visited Aug 7, 2010).
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associated overhead total approximately $25,000. Therefore, the
annual per-prosecutor cost to the North Publica treasury is
$100,000, for a total of $1,000,000 for all of North Publica's ten
prosecutors. The legislative research also found that the average
prosecutor disposes of 100 cases per year, for a per-case labor
cost of $1,000.
Various cost-cutting proposals float around, including one
plan to reduce the number of prosecutors by 80 percent (down to
two prosecutors) and another plan to eliminate the need for all of
the North Publica prosecutors. Legislators decide to survey the
market for legal services to determine their available options.
Ultimately, a request for proposals (RFP) is issued through various bar journals and newsletters in the state. The RFP seeks
proposals from private lawyers and law firms for contracts to
handle North Publica's criminal prosecutions. Offerors are asked
to describe their qualifications for handling criminal prosecutions, including any past experience with criminal work. All bidders also are required to outline the practical aspects of how the
criminal prosecutions would be handled as well as the fee structure for the contract.
The winning proposal is submitted by the law firm of Henry
& Bell, LLP, a 120-lawyer firm with six offices across the state.
Both name partners, John Henry and Edwina Bell, are former
North Publica prosecutors and have significant criminal defense
experience. The two senior lawyers are both known for being excellent supervisors of the young associates in their firm, all of
whom had been top performers in law school. The proposal specifies that the law firm's attorneys would prosecute all criminal
cases on behalf of North Publica in exchange for an annual flat
fee.
The proposal also contained a blueprint for how cases would
proceed with Henry & Bell serving as prosecutor. When the
North Publica police make an arrest, a lawyer from Henry & Bell
would be summoned to the courthouse to handle the initial
appearance and bail hearing. The Henry & Bell lawyer would
then assess the case and determine whether the prosecution
should proceed. If the Henry & Bell lawyer decided to charge the
defendant, Henry & Bell would handle the preliminary hearing,
plea bargaining and guilty plea (if any), motion to suppress and
other pre-trial motions, and Henry & Bell would try the case.
Assuming guilty plea or conviction, Henry & Bell would decide
on the sentence recommendation and argue in favor of a particular sentence. If there were a need to defend the conviction on appeal or on collateral review, Henry & Bell would do the briefing
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and argument, including deciding which positions to take and
what concessions to make. In cases where the involvement of a
prosecutor was required prior to arrest and apprehension, Henry
& Bell would handle all aspects of the investigation, including
obtaining search warrants, arrest warrants, and wiretaps and
planning undercover sting operations.
Henry & Bell would provide all secretarial support, word
processing, printing, photocopying, office supplies, expert witness, and laboratory fees training of associates in criminal
prosecution topics; and all other overhead expenses. In addition,
Henry & Bell would be solely responsible for the salaries and
benefits of the lawyers who performed the criminal prosecution
work on behalf of North Publica. As a result of the contractual
arrangement, North Publica would save $500,000 annually in
labor costs associated with criminal prosecution.
B.

US Department of Justice-Federal Outsourcing of Criminal
Prosecution

The Attorney General of the United States seeks to reduce
her workforce and the costs of criminal prosecution. After the
Congressional Research Service determines that there could be
significant cost savings associated with the outsourcing of the
prosecutorial function, she is able to persuade Congress to
authorize the contracting out of white-collar fraud prosecutions
50
to private law firms.
The Attorney General engages the 800-lawyer firm of
Shearman, Gray & Myers to handle the Justice Department's
white-collar criminal fraud prosecutions. The contract calls for
the firm to handle criminal prosecution in white-collar cases at a
greatly reduced hourly rate. Shearman, Gray & Myers would
provide all secretarial support, word processing, printing, photocopying, office supplies, expert witness and laboratory fees, training of associates in criminal prosecution topics, and all other
overhead expenses. In addition, the firm would be solely respon-

50 Although prosecution is thought by most to be an inherently executive function,
see Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the
Laws, 104 Yale L J 541, 658-59 (1994). But see Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein,
The President and the Administration, 94 Colum L Rev 1 (1994), the Department of
Justice and the office of the Attorney General itself are creatures of statute and may be
regulated by Congress as such. See, for example, Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the
Attorney General in Our ConstitutionalScheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism,
1989 Duke L J 561, 566-82.
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sible for the salaries and benefits of the lawyers who performed
the criminal prosecution work on behalf of the United States.
When the Federal Bureau of Investigation or some other
federal law enforcement or regulatory entity began to investigate
allegations of white-collar wrongdoing, a consultation between
the agency and Shearman, Gray & Myers would take place. The
attorneys and the agents would discuss investigative strategies
and would sketch out an investigative plan. Shearman, Gray &
Myers attorneys would work with the agency throughout the investigation, obtaining any search warrants, arrest warrants, or
wiretaps they deemed necessary, and directing witness interviews and other gathering of evidence. As part of the legislation
authorizing the outsourcing of the prosecutorial function, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would be amended to make
clear that these private law firm attorneys were to be treated as
government prosecutors for purposes of gaining access to the
grand jury and grand jury materials.
In addition, these private attorneys would be fully authorized to sign and file information and complaints to initiate criminal proceedings in cases not requiring grand jury indictment. All
charging decisions would be entrusted to Shearman, Gray &
Myers attorneys, subject only to grand jury or judicial findings of
probable cause in appropriate cases.
From the Department's perspective, the lawyers at the law
firm could do the work at a fraction of the cost of public, full-time
prosecutors. From the law firm's perspective, although the work
would not be as lucrative as the full-fee matters it handled for
private clients, the criminal prosecution work would always be
present, providing a solid source of billable hours for the firm's
lawyers, particularly in a down economy. Furthermore, the
criminal prosecutions would provide an excellent opportunity for
junior lawyers at the law firm to "cut their teeth" in courtroom
litigation.
These two hypothetical scenarios may seem far-fetched to
those of us who value and endorse the public prosecution norm.
The thought of private lawyers being contracted to perform the
seemingly exclusive state function of prosecuting violations of
the criminal law is somewhat jarring. However, as is discussed
below, these two thought experiments are actually grounded in
the present reality within many smaller jurisdictions around the
United States.
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Outsourcing the Prosecutorial Function to Private Actors

51
Governments outsource a significant amount of legal work.
Instead of using the often sizable stables of in-house lawyers-of
the city solicitor's office, state Attorney General's office, or
Department of Justice-governments sometimes decide to contract their legal work out to the private sector, a classic example
of outsourcing. Governments on the local, state, and federal
levels have contracted with private lawyers to handle all manner
of government lawsuits-relating to matters from antitrust and
tobacco to lead paint and handguns 52-often on a contingency fee
basis.5 3 Private lawyers also are sometimes retained to assist
government lawyers with civil enforcement activities. 54 This
"outsourcing" description also holds for those instances where
government entities contract out criminal prosecution to the
private sector.
Surprisingly, a significant amount of prosecution outsourcing already is being undertaken by smaller jurisdictions

51 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Ethical Problems in Federal Agency Hiring of Private
Attorneys, 1 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 85, 85 (1987) ("While the federal government
employs a very large in-house staff of over 17,000 attorneys to handle its legal problems,
it nevertheless spends over twenty-five million dollars a year to hire outside counsel to
represent its interests.") (internal citations omitted). But see William V. Luneburg,
Contracting by the Federal Government for Legal Services: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 63 Notre Dame L Rev 399, 399 (1988) ("Contracting for legal services by the Federal
Government has been, and continues to be, the exception rather than the rule.").
52 See, for example, Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on
Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and PrivateLawyering in Mass Litigation,
34 UC Davis L Rev 1, 17, 35 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., "When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes":
Myth and Reality about the Synthesis of PrivateCounsel and Public Client, 51 DePaul L
Rev 241, 241, 243 (2001); Rotunda, 1 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 85 (cited in note 51);
Jenna Greene, CadwaladerSlashed Rates for Treasury Work, Natl L J 27 (Oct 12, 2009)
(reporting on law firm's reduction of its attorneys' hourly rates for work on behalf of U.S.
Treasury Department's Troubled Assets Relief Program).
53 See, for example, County of Santa Clara v Superior Court of Santa Clara County,
235 P3d 21 (Cal 2010) (approving contingency fees for private firms hired to assist government attorneys in some public nuisance cases, but noting that due process would
likely bar the use of contingency fees for criminal prosecutions); Priceline.com, Inc v City
of Anaheim, 180 Cal App 4th 1130, 103 Cal Rptr 3d 521 (2010) (approving contingency
fees for private firms hired to assist government attorneys in tax assessment litigation).
Jurisdictions sometimes engage outside counsel on a pro bono basis. See, for example,
Mark Scarcella, Outside Counsel Worked Landmark Gun Case Pro Bono, Blog of Legal
Times (May 20, 2010), online at http/legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/05/dc-saysoutside-counsel-worked-handgun-case-pro-bono.html (visited Sept 11, 2010).
54 Telephone Interview with Betsy Miller, Esq. (private law firm attorney with practice representing governmental entities in civil matters) (Apr 27, 2010). Miller stressed
that, in her experience, state attorneys general who retain the assistance of private lawyers are bound by statute and custom to maintain control over the strategy and direction
of the matters. See id.
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across the nation. 55 These governments, with limited budgets for
criminal justice administration, often turn to the private bar for
prosecution services. Rather than spend scarce resources on a
traditional public prosecutor, some governments will pay private
lawyers or law firms to prosecute criminal matters within the
jurisdiction.
Prosecution outsourcing arrangements take a number of different forms. Some governments contract with private law firms
to handle criminal prosecutions on an hourly fee basis, much like
the arrangement depicted above in the federal outsourcing
thought experiment. 56 For example, the city of Davis, California
recently entered into an agreement with a California law firm
that paid the firm $180 per hour for a variety of legal services,
57
including the "[p]rosecution of municipal code violations."
Other prosecution outsourcing arrangements simply pay a
private lawyer or law firm a fee for each criminal prosecution
they handle. An example of this type of compensation scheme
can be found in the city of Sequim, Washington, which pays a
private attorney to handle criminal appeals "at a flat rate of $300
58
per individual case."

Still other outsourcing arrangements, like that imagined in
the "North Publica" thought experiment above, 59 have a private
lawyer or law firm prosecute all of the criminal cases in a jurisdiction for a flat annual fee. The town of Albany, Oregon has paid
a private law firm an annual flat fee of over $200,000 for prose60
cution and other legal services.
55 There are other examples of private influence on, or control over, criminal prosecution, such as victim-retained private prosecution and part-time prosecution. See Roger A.
Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 UC
Davis L Rev 411, 419-24 (2009). Furthermore, it is tempting to draw analogies between
qui tam actions and prosecution outsourcing. But see id at 425 n 44 (pointing out fundamental distinctions between prosecution outsourcing and qui tam actions); John D.
Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionalityof Private Prosecutors,47 Ark L
Rev 511, 595 (1994) ("Even if the Supreme Court refuses to declare the use of private
prosecutors unconstitutional in all cases, an interested prosecutor's participation at trial
must invalidate any conviction obtained for any serious offense."). Although there are a
number of common attributes among the various species of the private role in criminal
prosecution, see Fairfax, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 425-27 (cited in note 53), the focus of this
Article is limited to prosecution outsourcing.
56 See Part II.B.
57 Agreement for Legal Services, City of Davis, Californiaand McDonough, Holland&
Allen, PC (2006), online at httpV/cityofdavis.org/meetinga'councilpackets/20060110/
05DCityAttorneyContract.pdf (visited Mar 17, 2010).
58 Agreement for Prosecuting Attorney Services, City of Sequim, Washington (2003),
online at http//www.mrsc.org/contracts/s46ProsAttSvcs.pdf (visited Mar 17, 2010).
59 See Part II.A.
60 See Contract between Albany, Oregon and Long, Delapoer,Healy & McCann, PC
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Often an elected mayor or county executive or appointed city
administrator will engage the criminal prosecution services of a
private law firm pursuant to a negotiated agreement or following
a request for proposal process. 61 Although the reputation and
professional ability of the private firm obviously factor prominently into the selection, the desire to reduce costs and enhance
62
efficiency through the contract is a significant consideration.
Jurisdictions with relatively small populations may not have
the tax base to support a public prosecutor. In addition, the
crime rate in a sparsely populated community may not justify
the expenditure for a traditional full-time public prosecutor. Furthermore, privatizing criminal prosecution in these jurisdictions
can increase criminal prosecution capacity, which, in turn, might
enhance efficiency, public safety, and fairness by speeding criminal case processing, reducing crime, saving court administration
costs, and diminishing the human and financial costs of pretrial
detention.
Although much of current prosecution outsourcing is limited
to smaller jurisdictions and less serious criminal offenses, larger
jurisdictions very well may take note of the perceived benefits.
Government budgets are being reduced across the board, includ-

(2005) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
61 See, for example, City of North Bend, Washington and Kenyon Disend, PLLC,
Resolution 1174 (Jan 16, 2007) online at httpV/www.mrsc.org/contracts/N66egal.pdf
(visited Sept 11, 2010); City of Sequim, Washington, Request for Proposal for
Prosecutorial Services, online at http//www.mrsc.org/rfps/s46prosattysvcs.pdf (visited
Sept 11, 2010) (proposal for a contract that would acquire the services of a private attorney to prosecute alleged criminals on behalf of the city); City Council of Northfield,
Minnesota, Approve RFP for Prosecuting City Attorney Services, online at
httpV/www.ci.northfield.mn.us/assets/p/Packet145.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2010) (same).
62 See Telephone Interview with Scott Neal, City Manager of Eden Prairie, MN (Mar
2, 2010) (noting cost savings as the primary motivation for prosecution outsourcing in his
jurisdiction); Rupa Shenoy, Prosecutors Caught between Cost-Cutting and Profiteering,
Minnesota Public Radio (Mar 26, 2010).
As with outsourcing more generally, see Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability:
Privatization,Public-izationand Public Values, 15 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 111, 113 (2005),
there are various motivations for governmental outsourcing of legal services, including
efficiency, cost savings, and, in certain matters, the need for the expertise possessed by a
particular member of the private bar. See, for example, Patrick McFadden, Note, The
First Thing We Do, Let's Outsource All the Lawyers: An Essay, 33 Pub Cont L J 443, 443
(2004) ("There is no compelling reason why government lawyers should be exempt from
consideration in [the] outsourcing process. The same arguments that support outsourcing
of other services support outsourcing of government legal services."). See also id at 4 4448 (citing efficiency, expertise, and quality of service as rationales for government outsourcing of legal services); Lawrence, 61 Ind L J at 656-57 (cited in note 3) ("Persons with
certain kinds of expertise may be too expensive for government to employ or may prefer
less structured work environments than government can offer. Private delegation may be
a practical method of obtaining that sort of otherwise unavailable expertise.").
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ing in vital areas such as criminal prosecution. 63 Such budget
cuts no doubt hamper the ability of jurisdictions to provide optimal levels of law enforcement. 64 Given difficult economic conditions and increasing criminal justice demands, larger jurisdictions may consider the sort of outsourcing imagined in the
thought experiments above.
III. CONCERNS WITH PROSECUTION OUTSOURCING

A.

Accountability and Transparency

Prosecution outsourcing raises concerns about accountability
and transparency. Most chief prosecutors in the United States
are elected, with the remainder directly appointed by elected of65
ficials, sometimes with the confirmation of legislative bodies.
Perhaps the primary rationale for the tremendous discretion enjoyed by prosecutors is their accountability to the communities in
whose name they enforce the criminal laws. 66 Prosecutors wield
enormous power in deciding whether and what to prosecute.
Their decisions have long-lasting consequences not only for putative criminal defendants and victims of criminal conduct, but
also for law enforcement strategy, correctional resource allocation, and social policy more generally.
When private actors are contracted to perform the prosecution function, they exercise this power without the democratic
67
check that theoretically applies to public prosecutors.
63 See, for example, Hart, ProsecutorOffices Feel Pain from Budget Cut (cited in note
48) (describing recent cutbacks in funding for government prosecutorial functions); Berry,
Budget Questions Loom over DA's Office, Berkshire Eagle (cited in note 49) (noting that
district attorney positions may need to be cut in the face of budget reductions); Howard,
Public Safety Takes a Big Hit in King County, Federal Way Mirror (cited in note 49)
(budget cut forces downsizing of approximately 30 assistant district attorneys, or onesixth of prosecutorial staff).
64 See, for example, Lee, D.A. Cuts Efforts on Lesser Crimes, SF Chron B1 (cited in
note 49) (district attorney forced to decline all misdemeanor and small-quantity drug
prosecutions among other types of cases); Leinwand, Cuts Have Prosecutors "atBreaking
Point," Some Face Unpaid Leave, Less Support, USA Today 3A (cited in note 48) (discussing the nationwide scope of recent budget cutbacks).
65 See Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor 1011 (Oxford 2007) ("Mississippi was the first state to hold public elections for district attorneys. By 1912, almost every state had followed this trend. Today, only the District of
Columbia and four states-Delaware, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Connecticutmaintain a system of appointed prosecutors.")
66 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., ProsecutorialNullification? (unpublished manuscript,
2010) (on file with author).
67 It must be recognized, however, that there is a good deal of scholarly skepticism
regarding the prosecutorial accountability that the democratic process provides. See
Davis, Arbitrary Justice at 163-66 (cited in note 63) (outlining arguments that have been
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Furthermore, because private contractors perform most noncourtroom tasks in private offices away from public spaces and
actors and are not subject to government information disclosure
laws, there is even less transparency than we enjoy with regard
6
to public prosecutors.
Of course, the fact that prosecution outsourcing contracts
are negotiated and monitored by elected or otherwise politically
69
accountable officials may provide some degree of accountability.
Additionally, because public expenditures theoretically are subject to public scrutiny, there may be demands upon private contractors to increase access to internal office procedures and decision making.70 Nevertheless, prosecution outsourcing diminishes
the sort of accountability and transparency demanded of, and
theoretically provided by, public prosecutors.
B.

Underperformance

Related to the accountability concerns raised by prosecution
outsourcing is the worry that it may be difficult to ensure adequate performance of outsourced prosecutors. There are tremendous demands on the time of lawyers in private practice. A private firm may have litigation, transactional, or administrative
put forth that the democratic process of electing district attorneys does not have a sufficient abuse deterrence effect); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6
Ohio St J Crim L 581, 583 (2009); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away ProsecutorialAccountability?,83 Va L Rev 939, 963 (1997).
68 See Fairfax, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 444 (cited in note 53) ("[Tihe decision making
processes of public prosecutors are notoriously opaque."), citing Angela J. Davis, The
American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 Iowa L Rev
393, 448 (2001); Marc L. Miller and Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 Iowa L Rev 125,
129 (2008) (internal citations omitted) ("[Tihe absence of controlling statutes or case law
makes it possible for prosecutors to do their daily work without explaining their choices to
the public.").
69 For example, the performance of Henry & Bell lawyers under the outsourcing
arrangement depicted in the above thought experiment presumably would be reviewed by
the governor and the legislature at the time of contract renewal.
Indeed, the city manager in one jurisdiction that outsources its misdemeanor prosecutions to private law firms touts the ability of the city to withdraw from the contract
with ninety days notice if the city is unsatisfied with the contractor's performance. See
Telephone Interview with Scott Neal (cited in note 62).
70 For instance, in our Henry & Bell thought experiment, North Publica might require frequent reporting by the contracting firm on its decisionmaking processes related
to the criminal case dispositions.
One former "private prosecutor" recalls that her private law firm, which handled
criminal cases for one Minnesota jurisdiction, was subject to formal annual reviews and
more frequent informal performance reviews by the city manager and police department
command staff. See Telephone Interview with Jennifer Inz, Esq. (currently a public prosecutor in Hennepin County, Minnesota, who previously prosecuted criminal offenses for a
Minnesota jurisdiction for 17 years under an outsourcing contract as a private law firm
attorney) (Apr 27, 2010).
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matters taking place in far-flung venues and geographic regions.
Private law firms must generate sufficient revenues to pay not
only lawyer salaries and overhead, but the costs associated with
maintaining support staff. Although the government obviously
must meet payroll and pay overhead expenses, the practice decisions of individual government lawyers are not burdened with
such financial considerations.
Such pressures might affect a private lawyer's prosecutorial
performance in a number of ways. The demands of the contractor's private matters could monopolize the attorney's time, leaving the criminal prosecution matters without the appropriate
focus and attention. For example, Henry & Bell in the above
thought experiment might place criminal prosecution matters on
the back burner in order to accommodate work on behalf of a private client, particularly if the private client work is more lucrative. This could mean improper delays in the prosecution or processing of criminal cases, leading to court system backlogs, unfair treatment of pretrial detainees, and even speedy trial issues.
Just as troubling is the possibility that Henry & Bell might
begin to plead out cases for lesser sanctions than would normally
be deemed appropriate, in order to clear the decks for more private client work. Of course, a firm presumably would not engage
in a prosecution outsourcing arrangement if the firm believed
that the arrangement might hinder its ability to service private
clients. However, new clients and fresh matters arise all the
time, and circumstances can change dramatically after the outsourcing agreement has been executed.
C.

Ethical Concerns

There are also ethical concerns that can arise when a private
lawyer is entrusted with criminal prosecution authority. There
has long been strong support among reformers for the full-time
public prosecution norm because of the tremendous potential for
conflicts of interest when prosecutors also represent private clients. It is not difficult to recognize the conflict that would be
created were Henry & Bell or Shearman, Gray, & Myers to represent criminal defendants in a jurisdiction in which those firms
contracted to prosecute criminal cases. 71 Although such direct
71 In addition to the problems such a dual role would pose for the prosecution function, the Henry & Bell attorneys would be vulnerable to ineffective assistance of counsel
claim for breach of duty of loyalty. See Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 (1984) (presuming prejudice when defense counsel represents conflicting interests).
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conflicts can be avoided by requiring contractor firms to recuse
themselves from all criminal defense matters in the jurisdiction, 72 the danger of conflicts of interest do not end there. A firm
could show favoritism in a criminal case to one of its private civil
clients, or might use the discretionary power of criminal
investigation and prosecution as a weapon against a civil
litigation adversary.
In addition, some reasonably may be concerned that private
lawyers will be more susceptible to corrupting influences than
will public prosecutors. There is the aforementioned concern that
a private lawyer may use her criminal prosecution authority to
cow an adversary into submission in an unrelated civil matter. In
addition, the performance pressures associated with maintaining
a potentially lucrative criminal prosecution contract with a juris73
diction could create incentives to win conviction at all costs,
even through misconduct. Although it must be conceded that
there may be incentives for public prosecutors to ignore their
duty to ensure "that justice shall be done," 74 the perception-if
not the reality-of the increased danger of corruption and conflicts of interest associated with prosecution outsourcing is cause
for particular concern.
D.

Potential Constitutional Constraints

The sort of prosecution outsourcing illustrated in the above
thought experiment arguably is in tension with certain constitutional norms. Although governments enjoy broad authority
to outsource public functions, 75 and courts have been fairly liberal in approving delegations of government power to private actors, 76 privatization scholars often point to various constitutional
72 But see Telephone Interview with Jennifer Inz, Esq. (cited in note 70) (noting that
private prosecutors in Eden Prairie, MN are permitted to represent criminal defendants).
73 A National Public Radio affiliate story on prosecution outsourcing recounted that a
winning bidder for a prosecution outsourcing contract stated in its proposal that it would
increase the city's revenues by seeking court-imposed "prosecution costs" from defendants. Prosecution costs, which are directed to the jurisdiction's coffers, are imposed in
cases in which the prosecutor agrees to a conditional dismissal of a defendant's case in
exchange for the defendant's compliance with certain requirements and the payment of
the fee. See Shenoy, Prosecutors Caught between Cost-Cutting and Profiteering(cited in
note 62).
74 Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935). See also Fairfax, UC Davis L Rev at
440-41 (cited in note 53).
75 See Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 581 (cited in note 6) ("The federal government thus
retains considerable flexibility to make substantial delegations of its responsibilities, and
even of functions closely associated with core sovereign powers, to private parties.").
76 See, for example, Metzger, 103 Colum L Rev at 1375, 1440 (cited in note 1). See
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restrictions on such delegations-including due process, equal
77
protection, separation of powers, and nondelegation principles.
In addition to the problems inherent in the private exercise
of sovereign power,78 allowing private lawyers to wield prosecutorial authority raises fairness concerns.7 9 One concern is that
private attorneys will not be able to check improper incentives
influencing their exercise of discretion. Among these are the
financial and professional incentives to perform well (that is,
seek and obtain convictions) in order to enhance professional
reputation for the purpose of maintaining and developing other
areas of practice.
As was discussed above, conflicts of interest on the part of
the private attorney discharging prosecutorial duties may raise
due process concerns serious enough to warrant reversal of a
defendant's conviction.8 0 For example, a contracted prosecutor's
desire to benefit a client with interests at stake in a given
prosecution could result in prejudice to a criminal defendant.
Additionally, corruption in the prosecutorial decisionmaking process, resulting in bias, favor, or prejudice would give
rise to fairness concerns which could implicate both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 8 ' Another fairness concern
derives from the notion that when two private adversaries litigate, neither should wield the power of the state.8 2 This relates
also Lawrence, 61 Ind L J at 660 (cited in note 3).
77 See, for example, Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 632 (cited in note 6); Metzger, 103
Colum L Rev at 1437-38 (cited in note 1) ("This same due process concern exists in the
federal context, but here separation of powers constitutes an additional potential barrier
to delegation of power to private actors."). See also Verkuil, OutsourcingSovereignty at 15
(cited in note 6) ("[W]hen the Congress subdelegates to the president or the agencies or
the president further delegates to private parties, the Constitution still umpires the relationships."). But see Stanger, One Nation under Contract 26 (cited in note 2) ("The
Constitution is largely mute on what the founders thought about the proper balance
between private and public interests."). See also Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the
Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization,35 UCLA L Rev 911 (1988) (discussing federal and state nondelegation doctrines).
78 See Part III.E below.
79 See, for example, Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecutionof Crime in the
Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 Am J Legal Hist 43, 58 (1995) ("Conversely, a writer in the North CarolinaLaw Review in 1972 called for an end to private prosecution,
contending that it violated due process, the canons of ethics, and the modern role of the
prosecutor.").
80 See Part III.C above. Compare Pierce, 76 Geo Wash L Rev at 1221 (cited in note 1).
81 See Lawrence, 61 Ind L J at 661-62 & n 59 (cited in note 3); Ganger v Peyton, 379
F2d 709 (4th Cir 1967).
82 See, for example, Joan Meier, The 'Right" to a DisinterestedProsecutorof Criminal
Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 Wash U L Q 85, 108 (1992) ("Private prosecution is seen as unfair to defendants in two respects. First, it is argued that
the criminal prosecutor has the 'full machinery of the state' at his or her command, and
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not only to equity considerations vis-h-vis the accused,8 3 but also
to society's conception of whether and when it is appropriate for
private parties to wield state power.
Another set of constitutional values potentially implicated
by the contracting out of the prosecution function to private
attorneys may be found, at least in the federal context, in separation of powers and nondelegation doctrines. For example, some
commentators point to the Appointments Clause of the United
States Constitution,8 4 which provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
85
Departments.
The Appointments Clause is designed, in part, "to preserve political accountability relative to important government assignments."8 6 Paul Verkuil describes the Appointments Clause as a
"democracy-forcing requirement" established in part "to check
87
the exercise of private power on government."
When the executive contracts out the prosecution of crime to
a private party, he or she is, in a very real sense, delegatingthat
function outside of the constitutional structure. Of course, the
constitutional mandate that the executive "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed" does not require that the president
himself or herself actually prosecute criminal offenses against
the state;88 the President may delegate this responsibility vertically to principal and inferior officers.8 9 However, when the execthat use of such powers for private advantage is inherently unfair to defendants.").
83 But see id at 109-10 (highlighting arguments that even public prosecution does not
ensure fairness for criminal defendants).
84 See Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 585-86 (cited in note 6). See also Field, 15 Hofstra
L Rev at 656 & n 52 (cited in note 34).
85 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
86 Edmond v United States, 520 US 651, 663 (1997).
87 Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty 106 (cited in note 6). But see Pierce, 76 Geo
Wash L Rev at 1220 (cited in note 1).
88 US Const Art II, § 3, cl 4.
89 See Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty, at 102-03 (cited in note 6). See also
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utive delegates an executive function beyond the constitutional
boundaries of the executive branch, 90 constitutional constraints
on such delegations may be implicated. 91
For example, the Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) has long maintained the view that "purely ministerial and internal functions ... which neither affect the legal
rights of third parties outside the Government nor involve the
exercise of significant policymaking authority may be performed
by persons who are not federal officers or employees." 92 However,
OLC has been equally consistent in the view that "the authority
to direct litigation on behalf of the United States may not be
vested in persons who are not officers of the United States appointed in the proper manner under [the Appointments
Clause]." 93 Analyzing the Supreme Court's prominent treatment
ConstitutionalLimits on 'ContractingOut" Department of Justice Functions under OMB
CircularA- 76,14 Op Off Legal Counsel 94, 96, 1990 WL 488475 at *2 (1990).
90 Scholars have debated whether prosecution is an inherently executive function.
See, for example, Davis, 86 Iowa L Rev at 453-55 (cited in note 66) ("The prosecutorial
function falls within the executive branch of the government.... The framers viewed a
strong, unitary executive as advancing accountability because a fragmented executive
branch could more easily escape review."); Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L J at 658-51
(cited in note 50). But see Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum L Rev at 1 (cited in note 50);
William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacyof the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts,
57 Geo Wash L Rev 474, 485, 494, 500 (1989). See also Office of Legal Counsel,
ConstitutionalLimits on "ContractingOut" Department of Justice Functions under OMB
CircularA- 76 at 96 (cited in note 89) (collecting cases).
91 Although authorities are in accord that such delegations do implicate constitutional values, there are varying views as to which constitutional values are implicated. See,
for example, Verkuil, OutsourcingSovereignty at 103 (cited in note 6) ("If the president
assigns duties to private contractors that are normally performed by either principal or
'inferior' officers of the United States, the vertical dimension of separation of powers is
triggered."); Office of Legal Counsel, The ConstitutionalSeparationof Powers between the
President and Congress, 20 Op Off Legal Counsel 124, 1996 WL 876050 at *14 (May 7,
1996), online at http;//www.justice.gov/olc/delly.htm (visited Sept 11, 2010) ("The
Appointments Clause simply is not implicated when significant authority is devolved
upon non-federal actors."); id at *14 n 60 ("The delegation to private persons or nonfederal government officials of federal-law authority, sometimes incorrectly analyzed as
raising Appointments Clause questions, can raise genuine questions under other constitutional doctrines, such as the non-delegation doctrine and the general separation of
powers principle."); id at *14 ("Mhe simple assignment [to private individuals] of some
duties under federal law, even significant ones, does not by itself pose an Appointments
Clause problem.'). See also id at *14 n 62.
92 Office of Legal Counsel, ConstitutionalLimits on "ContractingOut" Department of
JusticeFunctions under OMB CircularA- 76 at 94, 99 (cited in note 89).
93 As the Office of Legal Counsel has stated:
There has always been in this Office a basic question whether it is appropriate
for the Attorney General (or the President) to contract out the litigation responsibility of the United States.... [O]n the constitutional level, we have long asserted that the making of litigation judgments (variously described as prosecutorial discretion or litigation management) is a function at the core of the President's Article II duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and
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of the Appointments Clause in Buckley v Valeo,9 4 the Office of
Legal Counsel concluded that the restriction of litigation to
"officers" applies in the criminal context.9 5 Therefore, it can
be argued, unless the private lawyer to whom prosecutorial
authority is delegated is an "officer," such a delegation would
96
contravene the Constitution.
E.

Government Contracting Law Norms

In addition, a body of statutory and regulatory law has developed around government "contracting out" of public functions.
What, if anything, does the positive law of government outsourcing have to say about the contracting out of the prosecution function? Although these laws scarcely address the outsourcing of the
prosecution function, the statutes and regulations governing the
bulk of government contracting reflect certain norms related to
the outsourcing of core government functions. Prosecution out97
sourcing is in serious tension with such norms.
The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998
("FAIR") distinguishes between "inherently governmental functions" and other functions, the latter residual category being subject to competition with the private sector for potential outsourcmust, therefore, be performed by those who serve under, and are responsible ultimately to, the President.
Office of Legal Counsel, Application of Conflict of Interest Rules to the Conduct of
Government Litigation by Private Attorneys, 4B Op Off Legal Counsel 434, 1980 WL
20939 (Feb 22, 1980). See also Office of Legal Counsel, ConstitutionalLimits on "Contracting Out" Department of Justice Functions under OMB Circular A- 76 (cited in note
89).
94 424 US 1 (1976) (per curiam).
95 Office of Legal Counsel, ConstitutionalLimits on "ContractingOut" Department of
Justice Functionsunder OMB CircularA- 76 at 94, 99 (cited in note 89).
96 See Luneburg, 63 Notre Dame L Rev at 401-02 (cited in note 51) ("Moreover, governmental policy-making itself is a function that must ultimately be vested, if not in
Congress, then in the President or an 'Officer of the United States' appointed in the manner prescribed by Article II of the Constitution. To the extent that the activities of a private attorney retained by the government can be considered to involve policy making, the
need for sufficient control by 'officers' of the United States is... present.").
97 The author is mindful that serious analytical limitations constrain the full application of the statutory and regulatory outsourcing regime to prosecution outsourcing. One
issue is that some of the laws apply only when government is seeking to replace existing
public employees with private contractors. To the extent that any prosecution outsourcing
would simply seek to supplement the existing public prosecutorial corps with private
contractors (rather than replace them), some laws would not apply. Another such limitation is that much of the law is largely aspirational. Finally, as this Article acknowledges,
see note 118 below, the federal outsourcing regulatory regime does not apply to state and
local outsourcing. However, the policy norms underlying the outsourcing laws (regulating
the public private distinction) can be instructive to state governments not necessarily
subject to similar legal constraints.
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ing. 98 The statute defines an "inherently governmental" function
as "a function that is so intimately related to the public interest
as to require performance by Federal Government employees. "99
The statute specifically enumerates certain functions that are
"inherently governmental," including "activities that require
either the exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government
authority or the making of value judgments in making decisions
for the Federal Government... ."100 FAIR goes on to explain that
"[a]n inherently governmental function involves, among other
things, the interpretation and execution of laws of the United
States so as ...

to determine, protect, and advance United States

economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by civil or criminal judicial proceedings ... ; [or] ...to significantly af-

fect the life, liberty, or property of private persons .... "101
FAIR, although not explicitly ruling out the outsourcing of
inherently governmental functions, 10 2 could reasonably be read
to assume that the practice is not authorized. In any event, the
definition of "inherently governmental functions" excluded from
FAIR's competitive sourcing plan would certainly seem to include
a potential contracting out of criminal prosecution. The statute's
references to "exercise of discretion," the determination of federal
interests by "criminal judicial proceedings," and "significantly
affect[ing] the life, liberty, or property of private persons" all
would militate in favor of the conclusion that prosecution would
be considered an "inherently governmental function."
The language of the Federal Acquisition Regulations
("FAR"), which apply to federal executive agency procurement,
supports even more concretely the view that criminal prosecution
is an "inherently governmental function" under federal outsourcing law. The FAR is clear in its policy stance against contracting out certain core government functions: "Contracts shall
not be used for the performance of inherently governmental func-

98 See Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub L No 105-270, 112 Stat
2382, codified at 31 USC § 501 note [hereinafter "FAIR Act"]; Stanger, One Nation under
Contract 15 (cited in note 2); Mathew Blum, The Federal Framework for Competing
Commercial Work, in Freeman and Minow, eds, Government by Contract at 66 (cited in
note 6).
99 FAIR Act, 31 USC § 501 note § 5(2)(A).
100 FAIR Act, 31 USC § 501 note § 5(2)(B).
101 FAIR Act, 31 USC § 501 note § 5(2)(B).
102 See, for example, Blum, The Federal Framework at 66 (cited in note 94); John
Cibinic and Ralph C. Nash, Contracting Out Procurement Functions: The 'Inherently
Governmental Function"Exception, 14 No 9 Nash & Cibinic Rep 45 (2000).
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tions."103 The regulations contain a non-exhaustive "list of examples of functions considered to be inherently governmental functions or which shall be treated as such." At the top of this list,
which includes "[t]he command of military forces," 10 4 "[t]he conduct of foreign relations," 10 5 and the "performance of adjudicatory
functions," 10 6 are "(1) [t]he direct conduct of criminal investiga10 8
tions" 10 7 and "(2) [t]he control of prosecutions."
The FAR also contains provisions specific to service contracts. A service contract is defined as a "contract that directly
engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an
end item of supply." 10 9 Therefore, a private lawyer contracted to
conduct a criminal prosecution might be considered to have a
service contract under the FAR. Here, the FAR states that
"[algencies shall not award a contract for the performance of an
inherently governmental function," 110 and makes reference to the
earlier list for guidance on what is an inherently governmental
function.11 Thus, the FAR demonstrates outsourcing law's categorical inclusion of the prosecution function as one of those inherently governmental functions that should not be contracted
out to the private sector.
Another key interpretive tool, OMB Circular No. A-76, is
published by the Office of Budget and Management as policy
guidance for competitive sourcing requirements. 112 This publication contains a number of relevant and informative provisions.
After stating the clear policy that agencies shall "[p]erform inherently governmental activities with government personnel," 113
103 48 CFR § 7.503(a).
104 48 CFR § 7.503(c)(3).
105 48 CFR § 7.503(c)(4).
106 48 CFR § 7.503(c)(2). The regulation, however, specifically excludes those adjudica-

tory functions "relating to arbitration or other methods of alternative dispute resolution."
48 CFR § 7 .503(c)(2).
107 48 CFR § 7.503(c)(1).
108 48 CFR § 7.503(c)(2).
109 48 CFR § 37.101.
110 48 CFR § 37.102(c).
111 48 CFR § 37.102(c).

112 The recent versions of Circular No. A-76 have changed substantially. The administration of President George W. Bush renamed "outsourcing" as "competitive sourcing"
and added it to the President's management agenda. See generally Steven L. Schooner,
Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder?, 33 Pub Cont L J 263 (2004).
113 Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (revised) 1 (May 29, 2003),
online at httpV/www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/file/ombassets/omWcirculars/a076/
a76 incl tech correction.pdf (visited Sept 11, 2010). An earlier version of the Circular
elaborated more fully on this policy:
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Circular A-76 goes on to define
activities":
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"inherently governmental

An inherently governmental activity is an activity that is
so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by government personnel. These activities
require the exercise of substantial discretion in applying
government authority and/or in making decisions for the
government. Inherently governmental activities normally
fall into two categories: the exercise of sovereign government authority or the establishment of procedures and
processes related to the oversight of monetary transactions or entitlements. An inherently governmental
activity involves: ...

(1) Binding the United States to take or not to take
some action by contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise;
(2) Determining, protecting, and advancing economic,
political, territorial, property, or other interests by...
civil or criminal judicial proceedings...;
(3) Significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property
of private persons .... 114

b. Retain Governmental Functions In-House. Certain functions are inherently
Governmental in nature, being so intimately related to the public interest as to
mandate performance only by Federal employees. These functions are not in
competition with the commercial sector. Therefore, these functions shall be performed by Government employees.
Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (revised) *1-2 (Aug 4, 1983) (on file
with U Chi Legal F).
114 Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (revised) A-2 (May 29, 2003).
The 1983 revision of the Circular, which was generally aggressive in its promotion of
outsourcing, see Stanger, One Nation Under Contract 15 (cited in note 2), nevertheless
was explicit in the notion that criminal prosecution is an "inherently governmental function":
e. An inherently Governmentalfunction is a function which is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by Government employees .... [These functions include those activities which require either the exercise of discretion in applying Government authority or the use of value judgment in making decisions for the Government.... Inherently Governmental
functions usually fall into two categories:
(1) The act of governing, i.e., the discretionary exercise of Government authority. Examples include criminal investigations, prosecutions and other
judicial functions..."
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Here again we see the "exercise of sovereign governmental authority," affecting governmental interests in criminal proceedings, and "significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of
private persons"-all key attributes of the criminal prosecution
function-enumerated as touchstones of inherently governmental functions. In addition, the "exercise of substantial discretion"
is cited as a hallmark of an inherently governmental function.
However, Circular No. A-76 cautions that "[w]hile inherently
governmental activities require the exercise of substantial discretion, not every exercise of discretion is evidence that an activity is inherently governmental." 11 5 The exercise of discretion
"shall be deemed inherently governmental if it commits the government to a course of action when two or more alternative
courses of action exist and decision-making is not already limited
or guided by existing policies, procedures, directions, orders, and
other guidance that (1) identify specified ranges of acceptable
decisions or conduct and (2) subject the discretionary authority to
final approval or regular oversight by agency officials." 11 6 Even
with this caveat, the tremendous, unchecked discretion traditionally enjoyed by prosecutors almost certainly would qualify
criminal prosecution as an inherently governmental function.
Criminal prosecution, it cannot be seriously disputed, qualifies as an inherently governmental function within the meaning
of the statutory and regulatory law governing federal outsourcing to the private sector. As such, one reasonably can conclude that discretionary prosecutorial activities would not be eligible for outsourcing by the federal government should the
Department of Justice seek to contract out criminal prosecution
to the private sector as is posed in the thought experiment
above. 117 Although this statutory scheme is not necessarily applicable to most existing prosecutorial outsourcing,1 1 8 it does illuminate important policy norms relevant to the delegation of
Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (revised) *2 (Aug 4, 1983).
115 Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76 (revised) A-2 (May 29, 2003).
116 Id.
117 See Part II.B. above.
118 Although most prosecution outsourcing currently takes place on the state level,
state outsourcing law, as outsourcing and privatization scholar Ellen Dannin observes, is
notoriously underdeveloped relative to federal law. See Dannin, 60 Md L Rev at 251 (cited
in note 3) (noting only "a handful of states that had [enacted comprehensive legislation on
privatization and subcontracting] ... and a patchwork of miscellaneous legislation in
states that had not"); Dannin, 15 Cornell J L & Pub Pol at 142 (cited in note 50) (noting
that "most states lack any regularized oversight of contracting"). For an examination of
state approaches to privatization, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatizationand Democracy,
in Freeman and Minow, eds, Government by Contract261-88 (cited in note 6).
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prosecutorial authority to private actors, including a strong skepticism of the delegation of discretionary functions. Even if such
norms are given short shrift in other areas of government
outsourcing, 119 perhaps they should be observed in the area of
criminal prosecution.
F.

Sovereignty and the Public Prosecution Norm

That prosecutorial discretion is broad and potent is widely
acknowledged. Prosecutors have largely unfettered discretion as
to whether and what to charge, and such decisions have profound
120
consequences for defendants, victims, and the community.
Particularly given the plea bargain-driven modern system of
criminal justice,' 21 prosecutors are the single most influential
organ of criminal justice administration.
However, the prosecutor's discretionary power has profound
meaning apart from its administrative role and impact. By declining to prosecute a winnable case, either in an individual case
or across the board under a particular criminal statute, prosecutors decide whether a law will be enforced. 122 In one context, the
prosecutor's decision to decline prosecution in a specific case in
the interest of justice places in the prosecutor's hands the sovereign prerogative of forbearance against a particular defendant.123
In another context, a prosecutor who decides that a certain law
will not be enforced because it does not comport with her policy

119 See generally Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty (cited in note 6); Schooner and
Greenspahn, J Cont Mgmt 209 (Summer 2008) (cited in note 6).
120 See, for example, Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional
Design, 93 Cornell L Rev 703, 732-33 (2008); Young v Vuitton et Fils SA, 481 US 787, 814
(1987) ("Between the private life of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation
stands the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ the full machinery of
the state in scrutinizing any given individual. Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted,
forced immersion in criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching disruption of
everyday life. For this reason, we must have assurance that those who would wield this
power will be guided solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of
justice.").
121 See, for example, Michael M. OTIear, Plea Bargainingand ProceduralJustice, 42
Ga L Rev 407, 409 (2008); Ronald Wright and Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining
Tradeoff, 55 Stan L Rev 29, 30 n 1 (2002) ("In the federal system, the proportion of convictions obtained through pleas of guilty or nolo contendere has reached 95% and has been
climbing steadily for over 30 years.").
122 See Fairfax, ProsecutorialNullification? (cited in note 66).
123 See Austin Sarat and Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 Law & Soc Inquiry 387, 390 (2008) ("Yet the decisions prosecutors make involve, in our view, something more than a straightforward
exercise of discretion. Where others see discretion, we see a fragment of sovereignty.").
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preferences can singlehandedly determine whether a law, though
124
passed by the legislature, will be a dead letter.
Whether or not there are good reasons for prosecutors to
have this tremendous authority to exercise the sovereign prerogative, ceding this authority to private actors is problematic to say
the least. The system of private prosecution dominant in the
United States in the nineteenth century eventually gave way to
the public prosecution norm we enjoy today. 125 Although there
are a number of reasons the public prosecutor achieved prominence in modern criminal justice, 126 one significant reason is that
public prosecution bolsters public confidence in the fairness and
impartiality of criminal justice.
As the Supreme Court has reminded us, the government's
interest in a criminal case "is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done." 127 Even if, for instance, the Henry &
Bell lawyers prosecuting criminal cases were vigilant to ensure
their fidelity to this ideal, there is very little assurance that they
are operating as honest brokers. Private lawyers working criminal cases under an outsourcing contract are not as likely to share
the professional identity of public prosecutors, which incorporates the values discussed above.1 28 When sworn government
employees rather than private lawyers litigate a criminal case,
124 See Fairfax, ProsecutorialNullification? (cited in note 66). See generally Richard
E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failureof CriminalLaw through a Criminal
Sunset Amendment, 49 BC L Rev 1327 (2008).
125 For more on the history of private prosecution, see Davis, ArbitraryJustice 9 (cited
in note 63); Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public"Prosecutors in
HistoricalPerspective, 39 Am Crim L Rev 1309, 1326 (2002); Meier, 70 Wash U L Q at
103-07 (cited in note 78); Ireland, 39 Am J Legal Hist at 49 (cited in note 79).
The system of private prosecution-where victims had the responsibility and authority to hire private counsel to prosecute criminal cases against the wrongdoer-is not
analogous to prosecution outsourcing, in which the state retains responsibility for criminal prosecution but contracts the work out to private lawyers. Nevertheless, both private
prosecution and prosecution outsourcing certainly are in tension with the public prosecution norm. See Fairfax, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 426 (cited in note 53).
126 Id at 432-33 & n 78.
127 Berger v US, 295 US 78, 88 (1935).
128 See Fairfax, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 435 ("[TJhe public nature of the prosecutorial
role has been absorbed by and is intertwined with the professional identity of prosecutors."). The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section bestows the "Norm
Maleng Minister of Justice Award" annually to a prosecutor who represents the ideals
associated with the public prosecution norm. The criteria for the award require that it be
given to "a prosecutor who exemplifies the principles that: (1) the prosecutor's obligation
is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty; (2) the prosecutor must guard
the rights of the accused as well as enforce the rights of the public; and (3) the prosecutor's commitment to the legal and ethical standards must be unwavering." See ABA
Criminal Justice Section, Norm Maleng Minister of Justice Award, online at
http//www.abanet.org/crimjust/ministerousticeaward.doc (visited Sept 11, 2010).
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we may have greater confidence that the Supreme Court's admonition to "do justice" is heeded and that the government's solemn obligation is met.
CONCLUSION

It is difficult enough to manage and constrain the discretionary authority of public prosecutors. The most promising
mechanisms for doing so are democratic accountability and prosecutorial professionalization, both of which are either diminished
or lacking in the prosecution outsourcing context. Prosecutors do
much more than bring to court criminal matters; they are
charged with the solemn duty to "do justice"-a task involving
judgment and the wise exercise of discretion, and one not
easily instrumentalized for purposes of an outsourcing contractual arrangement.
As the author has argued elsewhere, there are ways we
might attempt to mitigate the various concerns with the private
exercise of criminal prosecution authority. 129 Among these are
limiting private actors to "ministerial" functions, guiding the discretion private actors exercise, and implementing mechanisms to
enhance the transparency of prosecutorial decisions made by private contractors. 130 Furthermore, incentives might be embedded
in these outsourcing agreements to encourage private actors to
act in the public interest. However, even with these remedial
efforts, there remains the fundamental concern that it is inappropriate to outsource to private actors a function so closely identified with the sovereign prerogative of the state.
Nevertheless, other forms of criminal justice outsourcing,
such as private prisons and some species of private policing, have
developed and even expanded despite similar concerns. Given the
fiscal crisis facing jurisdictions around the nation, the perceived
cost savings associated with prosecution outsourcing may overshadow the serious drawbacks of eroding the public prosecution
norm. Thus, regardless of the fundamental challenge it poses to
our understanding of the public/private distinction, query
whether prosecution outsourcing is the inevitable next step in
the troubling march toward greater privatization of criminal
justice.

129 Fairfax,

43 UC Davis L Rev at 435.

130 See id at 448-55.

